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I.

ABSTRACT

The increased intensity of global rapprochement of laws is a
signature feature of the 21st century. Until the mid-20th century,
very little cross-fertilization between common law and civilian
systems was the rule. That has now radically changed. The latest
example of common law concepts being embraced by the legal
systems of Civil Law European countries is the introduction of
major aspects of the common law of trusts (“CLT”). Originally CLT
were considered to be a non-transplantable idiosyncratic legal
institution. Later, however, a discourse began on the versatility
and the economic usefulness of CLT in many settings. Starting
out, discussions concerning CLT were limited to pointing out that
conditional functional equivalents are offered by some European
countries, such as the Germanic “Treuhand.”1
 Professor of Law and Chair of the International Business Law Program
at Central European University, Budapest – Hungary. The author would like
to express his gratitude to Krzysztof Kaźmierczyk (Dentons, Warsaw ) and to
Cătălin-Gabriel Stănescu for assistance provided with writing this article.
  Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School of Law,
Hartford, Connecticut, USA. The author expresses his gratitude to Peter J.
Anastasio Jr. for his valuable assistance in writing this article.
1. The German term Treuhand (also recognized in Austria, Switzerland,
and some other European countries, represents “essentially a contractual
relationship” that is “a creature of case law.” Under “the Treuhand, or
mandate, the settlor (Treugeber) transfers property to the fiduciary
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Today, the prevailing view is that CLT are not just needed by
European countries, but that CLT doctrine can be made
compatible with the requirements of the civilian legal tradition.
The new approach is best expressed by the Draft Common Frame
of Reference, Book X – which is devoted entirely to trusts. A
growing number of European national laws now embrace the
concept of CLT (e.g., the French “fiducie”2 or its Romanian
replica).3
Hungary is an interesting example of a European country
that has adopted major concepts of CLT doctrine, not just because
it is the newest member of European countries to embrace
provisions of CLT, but because it has specifically chosen to be
inspired only by CLT law in spite of otherwise belonging to the
Germanic legal tradition. 4
(Treuhänder) and gives him instructions on its management and for those
whose benefit he holds the property . . .[T]he fiduciary administers the
property subject to the settlor’s instructions, generally does not conduct
business, and distributes benefits to passive beneficiaries who are not
associates. Because under German law the difference between legal and
equitable title is not known, the Treuhand relationship is enforceable between
the settlor and the trustee, at least in damages for breach of trust, but it is not
enforceable vis-à-vis third parties, because to them the Treuhänder is the
absolute owner.” International Estate Planning § 8.09 (Henry Christensen III
ed., 2d ed. 2013). It should also be noted that according to the German Federal
Court of Justice, the common law trust is neither reconcilable with the
dogmatic system of German law, nor is it comparable to Treuhand. See
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 13, 1984 – Iva ZR
196/82 1984 (Ger.).
2. See infra Part D.
3. Attila Menyhárd & Lajos Vékás, Commentary on Chapter XLIII on
Trusts, in A POLGÁRI TÖRVÉNYKÖNYV MAGYARÁZATOKKAL [Civil Code
Commentary] 794 (Lajos Vékás ed., 2013) (statement of Lajos Vékás, Head of
the Codification Committee of the 2013 Hungarian Civil Code) (“[[T]he new
Hungarian Civil Code of 2013] would like to satisfy an important economic
need with the domestication of the legal institution of trust, taking into
account as well that in fact a distinct industry already exists in this domain . .
.”).
4. At the forefront of the Germanic legal tradition, a sub-group of the civil
law legal family, is German law. Other sub-groups of the civil law legal family
include Romanic (Napoleonic) and Scandinavian legal traditions. Besides
Germanic and Hungarian law, scholars typically list Austria, the Czech
Republic, the Netherlands, Poland, the Baltic states, Russia, and Switzerland
as members of the civil law legal family. See e.g., PHILIP R. WOOD,
COMPARATIVE LAW OF SECURITY INTERESTS AND TITLE FINANCE 6-9 (2d ed.
2007). As a direct result of history, geographic proximity, and strong economic
ties, Hungarian law, in contemporary times, has been primarily influenced by
German and – until cohabitation with the Austro-Hungarian Empire ceased at
the end of World War I – Austrian law. As a result, the Hungarian legal
system shares most of the key features of Germanic legal tradition, in
particular system thinking (as opposed to the topical thinking of common law)
and reliance on codes as primary sources of law instead of case law. As the
doyens of comparative law, Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz put it – though
related to both Germanic and Romanic families – these “are marked by a
tendency to use abstract legal norms, [and] to have a well-articulated system
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CLT will undoubtedly continue to be of great interest to much
of Europe. Recognition must be made that both in the United
States (U.S.), 5 and in other common law nations, there are
variations in CLT, although there is agreement on its basic tenets.
Given that in Hungary the gates for professional trustees were
recently opened and separate licensing and prudential regulations
created, 6 that may place Hungary as a leader in expansion of the
containing well-defined areas of law...” K ONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN K ÖTZ, AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 69 (3d ed. 1998); see also H. PATRICK
G LENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD (3d ed. 2007) (explaining in more
detail these and other differences that exist between various legal families,
including Anglo-Saxon [common laws] and civilian legal systems).
However, the teaching of legal families should serve as no more than a
useful starting tool. This is because Hungarian law (similar to the other
jurisdictions which belong to this group) has an increasing pool of legal
categories and characteristics that are radically different from German law.
For example, while Hungary reformed its secured transactions by borrowing
numerous elements from Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code of the
U.S., Germany and Austria have thus far been completely immune to such
American influences. Interestingly, Hungary has failed to take over the
German conditional equivalent of common law trusts – the previously
described ‘Treuhand’ – and thus the new Hungarian common law -inspired
concept of trust will be another noteworthy point of departure with the
Germanic legal family.
5. Under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, e ach of
the fifty states retain control over legal issues not specifically delegated to the
federal government. U.S. CONST. amend. X. For this reason, trusts and estates
law is predominately the law of each state. In an effort to unify state law, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”)
was created in 1892. While NCCUSL has promulgated several Uniform Acts
for state adoption in the field of trusts and estates (e.g., the Uniform Probate
Code [“UPC”] and the Uniform Trust Code [“UTC”]), many of the states have
chosen not to adopt the Uniform Laws.
6. The function of statute No. XV of 2014 on the Trustees and on the Rule
of their Activity (which became law at the same time as the new Civil Code
incorporating the concept of trust) is to ensure that only highly professional,
ethically impeccable, and financially healthy entities or individuals appear as
trustees. See 2014. évi XV. Törvény a bizalmi vagyonkezelőkről és
tevékenységük szabályairól (Act XV on the Trustees & on the Rules of their
Activity) (Hung.). These goals are accomplished by subjecting all professional
trustees to licensing, liability insurance, and conduct of business regulations.
For example, professional trustees must obtain a high liability insurance
coverage policy, the value of which will increase depending upon the value of
assets handled. See § 7(1) of the Act. The basic liability insurance was set by
the Act at 70 million Hungarian Forints (on Oct. 24, 2014, roughly equal to
$291,000 USD). The Act imposes duties also with respect to the qualifications
of the staff, as it foresees that professional trust companies must employ one
economist, one lawyer, and one accountant, each with university-level degrees.
See § 4(5) of the Act. Lastly, a separate chapter of the Act addresses specific
conduct of business rules. There include: [1] best performance rule (§ 36), [2]
duty to inform (§ 37), [3] duty to maintain records (§§ 39-40), [4] duty of
confidentiality (§ 42), [5] limitations on benefiting from the trust by th e
trustee or a specific third party (§ 43), and [6] limitations on outsourcing the
services (§ 44).
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use of CLT in Europe, both for personal estate planning and for
business done with the United States.

II. INTRODUCTION
A. The Broad Picture
Today, when law is shown to work well in one country, that
law is often adopted on a global basis. Whereas until the mid-20th
century there was very little cross-fertilization between common
law and civilian law systems, that has now radically changed.
Almost unnoticed, the era of the dominance of conflict of law rules
has been gradually replaced by the age of transplantation; though
admittedly variations may still exist from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. One of the latest examples of successful transplants is
the adoption of major provisions of CLT by Hungary, so that
Hungary now has its own version of trust law (HLT).

B. The Impact of Common Law Trusts on European
Civilian Systems
In modern times the impact of CLT on civilian systems can be
subdivided into four phases:
The Era of Rejection and Then Understanding –
characterized by the outright rejection of the feasibility of the
transposition of CLT by Continental European mainstream
scholarship. This was then followed by decades in which a
discourse began on the versatility and the economic usefulness of
CLT and its compatibility with European civil laws. This era,
which featured the softened stance of European comparatists, can
be conveniently named as the era of discourse, especially because
it remained limited to stressing and proving that conditional
functional equivalents of CLT are offered by some civil law
doctrines, such as the Germanic “Treuhand.” 7
Infiltration of Common Law Trust Law – Some aspects of
CLT law infiltrated some of the civil law jurisdictions during the
early years, such as the pet child of the banking sector – trust
versions of escrow accounts. It is fair to claim that the European
escrows were normally not thought of as having much to do with
CLT. Moreover, in those Continental European civil law
jurisdictions that have failed to pick up the reform gauntlet,
refusing to introduce CLT as a sui generis legal institution, various
other types of fiduciary (thus, trust-like) legal categories are being
employed.
7. Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Convention on the Law
Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition (July 1, 1985),
www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=59.
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Poland might be mentioned as a perfect example.8 When
asked, local lawyers will point to European legal concepts as
equivalent to CLT. But this claim should always be treated with a
degree of caution, as these types of substitutes are hardly more
than conditional functional equivalents.
The View Today – The prevailing view today is that CLT
concepts are needed and their use can be made compatible with
the requirements of the civilian legal tradition. Claiming that we
are now in the trust-transplantation era is therefore not too farfetched. The priority of the reasons behind the shift differs from
country to country as does the usefulness of the adoption of CLT
law. Even if the need for CLT law for estate planning may still be
marginal, because of the flexibility of CLT it can be expected to
grow in use. The current need to use CLT concepts to facilitate
business transactions alone justifies the need for the change.
In France, for instance, one decisive push towards the use of
CLT law may be attributed to the desire to make the French
capital markets internationally more competitive, including
attraction of Islamic investors through the use of the local version
of trust – the “fiducie” – to satisfy the requirements of Sharia law.
In Central and Eastern Europe, trust will predictably become
rather a useful tool for the transfer of intergenerational wealth of
the indigenous local, typically family-type, businesses that were
launched after the fall of communism in the early 1990s.
Unification – The shift and the new approach is best
expressed by the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), the
product of an elite group of European private and commercial law
experts who have expressed the pan-European perspective of what
law in Europe should be in the 21st century. 9
Book X of this civil code-like document is entirely devoted to
trusts. The DCFR deserves special mention, not only as the latest
European development, but because it seems to be more successful
than its predecessors in influencing what national states do – as is

8. The closest comparable to common law trust may be a single provision of
Article 59 of the Banking Act (in force since 2004) in regards to escrow
accounts. Namely, here the separation of the assets transferred into the hands
of the bank (trustee) and those of the trustor (grantor) seem to be complete. In
the case of other fiduciary transactions recognized by Polish law, this is not
necessarily so. This applies especially to the so -called ‘security transfers,’ as
alternatives of secured transactions. See Krzysztof Kaźmierczyk & Filip
Kijowski, Enforcement of Contracts in Poland, in THE CASE LAW OF CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE – ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS 633 (Stefan Messmann
& Tibor Tajti eds., 2009) (discussing the legal treatment of security transfers
(with a case reproduced)).
9. PRINCIPLES , DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) Outline Edition
(Christian von Bar, Eric Clive & Hans Schulte -Nolke eds., 2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf.
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best illustrated in this article by French and Hungarian laws
dealing with CLT. 10

C. A Closer Look at the Latest European Developments–
The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)
The DCFR – a sui generis soft law instrument, resembling a
typical civil code, grew out of the recognition that the prohibitive
differences that continue to exist among the private and
commercial laws of European national states are a serious obstacle
to cross-border trade. Resembling the rationale that led to
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (created as a
proposed Uniform Act by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the U.S.), there is a
crucial difference between the UCC and the DCFR: while the UCC
became one of the biggest successes of the 20th century, being
adopted in some form by every state in the U.S. and influencing
the law of other countries, the idea that the DCFR should be
transformed into the first common European civil code was
rejected. 11
Thus, the DCFR remains exploitable only for teaching or for
use by courts and arbitrators deciding cases with foreign
elements. 12 Notwithstanding the limited use of the DCFR, an
important issue should not be left out of sight and thus should be
underlined once again: Book X of the DCFR is entirely devoted to
trusts, plus Book IX deals with a list of recognized security
devices, including the trust receipt – or the trust’s employment as
a security device. In other words, Europe’s academic elite is also of

10. See Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, supra note 7. See also
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TRUST LAW (David Hayton, S.C.J.J. Kortmann &
H.L.E. Verhagen eds., 1999) (analyzing the eight principles of European trust
law (together with national reports) developed by the Business and Law
Research Centre Nijmegen (the Netherlands), formed in 1996 when under the
influence of the Hague trust convention the issue of introduction of trust by
civil law systems has been given a thrust). The eight principles aim not only to
show to European civil laws what potential lies hidden in the concept but also
to provide some guidance to domestication of trust. Id. The research centre’s
webpage is at: www.ru.nl/law/businessandlawresearchcentre/.
11. See Tibor Tajti, The Unfathomable Nature and Future of the European
Private Law Project, 2 CHINA-EUR. UNION L.J. 69, 76 (2013). See also Tibor
Tajti, Systemic and Topical Mapping of the Relationship of the Draft Common
Frame of Reference and Arbitration 11 (Kazimieras Simonavičius University
2013), www.ksu.lt/!downloads/2014/02/tibor-tajati.pdf (canvassing the history,
key features and analysis of sales, franchise and secured transactions law of
DCFR from the perspective of the arbitrability of the pertaining parts of
DCFR. As the DCFR Book X on trusts is linked to Book IX on secured
transactions, the reflections on the arbitrability of secured transactions claims
apply mutatis mutandis also to trusts).
12. See Tajti, Systemic and Topical Mapping of the Relationship of the
Draft Common Frame of Reference and Arbitration, supra note 11.
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the opinion that the Old Continent should introduce the concept of
trust because available contractual and other conditional
substitutes cannot produce the same results needed both in
business and in private life. The DCFR has surely influenced the
drafters of the new Hungarian Civil Code, including the HLT. 13
A brief account of some of the key features of the DCFR
section on trusts will illustrate some of the problems the drafters
faced when trying to reconcile the newcomer institution –
perceived functionally or from the perspective of what
“performance” is to be expected from the transplant – as it
interacts with legal institutions of civil laws. First, although the
DCFR extends to all types of trusts, it does not preclude national
laws from opting for a narrower reach. 14 This seems to be sensible
especially as to such specific trust types as security trusts
(normally forgotten about by secured transactions law reformers)
and court-made trusts,15 as well as trusts arising by operation of
law. 16
Unlike Hungarian law, trusts are not deemed to be creatures
of contract law, but are rather conceived to be of sui generis nature
coming closer to property law. 17 As it remains obscure as to what
will be the concrete repercussions of the peculiar nature of trust
law under the DCFR, one gets the impression that the drafters
have been primarily concerned with satisfying the theoretical
(dogmatic) expectations of civil laws for an impeccable abstract
system rather than wrestling with many of the practical problems.
While the fiduciary nature of the trust is particularly stressed
in the DCFR, 18 basically nothing in the provisions tries to give
teeth to the application of this complex common law concept.
Whereas litigation in the U.S. constantly refines trust law and the
duties of a fiduciary, the main explanation the drafters of the
DCFR have provided is related only to the transfer of title onto the
trustee that gives him “all the rights of an owner of the fund.”19
Only a modest list of obligations are imposed on the trustee,20 none
13. See, e.g., Lajos Vékás, A polgári törvénykönyv magyarázatokkal (the
comments to the new civil code) 20 (2013); György Wellmann, Az új Ptk.
magyarázata 36 (2013).
14. PRINCIPLES , DEFINITIONS , AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW, supra note 9, at 5669.
15. Id. at Article X.-1:10(2)(a)(ii).
16. Id. at Article X.-1:101(2)(b).
17. As the Comments put it: “A trust is treated by [the DCFR] as an
obligation sui generis. It is not a contractual obligation, though clearly there
are substantial parallels…Instead, because of the significant third party
effects which a trust is capable of generating, the trust is seen as buttressing
(if not part of) property law.” PRINCIPLES , DEFINITIONS , AND MODEL RULES OF
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 9, at 5679.
18. Only the Comments stress it and no section of DCFR “explicitly provide
for the fiduciary nature of the relationship.” Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 5679-80.

716

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:709

of which could be a proper substitute for dealing with the
equitable nature of CLT and the many lines of cases on fiduciary
duties known to U.S. law. Unlike the many remedies for breach of
trust available in the U.S., under the DCFR, the main remedy for
breach by the trustee is only damages (a remedy overwhelmingly
of ex post nature), and the enforcement of that remedy may take
years. As we will see below, most of the limited DCFR remedies
were also adopted by the Hungarians, so it is Hungary where the
unique model embraced by the DCFR will first likely be tested in
practice.

D. Continental European Civil Law Systems
Exemplified: the French “Fiducie”
The French version of trust – the “fiducie” – was introduced,
after years of hesitation, 21 in 2007,22 notwithstanding repeated
requests for action on the part of bankers and public notaries
expressed quite forcefully from the late 1980s on. Once put into
practice, the new law underwent significant changes, including
making the fiducie usable by individuals, erecting a registry for
trust instruments in 2010, and adding the possibility of its use as
a credit security device (similar to the U.S. security device, the
trust receipt).
The fiducie is a hybrid form of trust, bearing the features not
only of its common law kin but also of its relatives known in the
laws of Luxembourg and Lichtenstein. In the end, and to the
extent such paradigmatic civil law concepts as the indivisibility of
the concept of ownership23 allow, the fiducie can be essentially
looked upon as a reasonably close equivalent of the CLT. The
French trust is now being used not only for intergenerational
transfer of wealth but even for attracting Islamic investors, given
that either the trust or the fiducie may be exploited to satisfy the
21. FRANÇOIS BARRIÈRE & MICHEL G RIMALDI , TRUST AND ‘FIDUCIE ,’ IN
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 1087 (Christian von Bar ed., 2011).
22. Loi 2007-211 du 19 février 2007 instituant la fiducie [Law 2007-211 of
Feb. 19, 2007 on the Introduction of Fiducie], www.legifrance.gouv.fr
/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000821047.
23. See Michel Grimaldi, Introduction of the Trust into French Law , 2
HENRI CAPITANT L. REV . (2011), www.henricapitantlawreview.fr/article.
php?lg=en&id=309. Grimaldi speaks of a ‘fiduciary ownership’ transfer onto
the trustee; an ownership that cannot be taken as a full-scale civil law
ownership because it has neither the same ‘substantive content,’ nor the same
‘substantive elements.’ For example, the fiduciary ownership of the trustee is
neither perpetual, nor exclusive. Likewise, his rights are limited as he cannot
gather the fruits or dispose of the object transferred to his own benefit. In
brief, notwithstanding the lack of the concept of divided ownership in French
law, through contractual means the same entitlements are transferred onto
the trustee as in common law. The peculiar restrictions imposed in fact are
those factors that make the fiducie heavily resemble and functionally make it
almost equivalent with common law trusts.
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expectation of Islamic finance and Sharia law for issuance of
“sukuk.”24 Still, there is a meaningful discourse on demystifying
what exactly is happening to fiduciary ownership in the context of
the French fiducie.25 Romania has also introduced its own version
of the fiducie (following the French model) with its new Civil Code
of 2011. 26

E. Continental European Civil Law Systems
Exemplified: the New Hungarian Trust
1.

The New Civil Code of 2013: Nomination of the Trust
Contract

As Hungary’s very first civil code was adopted during
Communism in 1959, 27 the need for a new code was recognized
right after the demise of that system. Still, more than two decades
were needed for the adoption of the brand new Code in 2013. 28
From a U.S. perspective, it should be of interest that the
Hungarian Code was influenced by the common law in many
respects, from the nomination of business model franchise
(obviously an American transplant) as a self-standing newcomer
contract, 29 to taking over further elements from U.S. secured

24. See The Legal Environment of the Paris Financial Marketplace, PARIS
EUROPLACE
Financial
Law
Committee,
(2009-10),
www.pariseuroplace.net/files/environnement_juridique_2009_2010.pdf;
Issuing
and
Listing Sukuk in France How to Take Advantage of the Attractive French Legal
and Tax Environment: French Sukuk Guidebook, PARIS EUROPLACE ISLAMIC
FINANCE LAW COMMITTEE , (Nov. 2011), www.paris-europlace.net/files/French_
Sukuk_Guidebook_Nov_2011.pdf.
25. See also Blandine Mallet-Bricout, The Trustee: Mainspring, or Only a
Cog, in the French Fiducie?, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST 141(Lionel Smith
ed., 2013) (Analyzing the differences as far as the position of the trustee is
concerned under common law and the French version of trust and concluding
that trustees are indispensable for the operation of both institutions). What is
important for the purposes of this paper is that in the opinion of the author,
common law trusts and the French fiducie are ‘neither siblings nor rivals.’ Id.
at 141.
26. 71/2011. This law came into force on October 1, 2011 and replaced the
first and only Civil Code of Romania of 1864. See also Luminiţa Tuleaşca, The
Concept of the Trust in Romanian Law, 6 ROM . ECON. & BUS. REV . 150 (2011),
http://econpapers.repec.org/article/raujournl/v_3a6_3ay_3a2011_3ai_3a2_3ap_
3a150-160.htm (explaining the history and basic features of the newly
introduced Romanian version of trust. According to the author, the Romanian
trust is looked upon as a specific form of contract).
27. 1959. évi IV. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről (Act IV of 1959 on the
Civil Code) (Hung.).
28. 2013. évi V. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről (Act V of 2013 on the
Civil Code) (Hung.).
29. Franchise is regulated in Book VI on obligations, Part Three on specific
nominated contracts, Title 19, and Chapter LI are entirely devoted to it.
Though, as only six relatively short paragraphs are on franchise, very little
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transactions law and Article 9 of the UCC, 30 through the
introduction of the trust concept. Although some fiduciary
transactions – like the escrow account known to American lawyers
and bankers – had already arrived to Hungary (and the region)
prior to the new Code, these concepts could only conditionally be
equated with trust law proper. Similar fiduciary institutions of law
dominate in some countries of the region like Poland.
2.

Hungarian versus US Trusts: Some Dilemmas

Admittedly, Hungary is comparably a small jurisdiction and
market, yet what makes it idiosyncratic, and thus of particular
interest to scholars of comparative law, is that it deliberately
opted for transplantation of not the German Treuhand or the
French fiducie-type model but the Anglo-Saxon trust concept.
Drafters of the Hungarian Code undertook what was thought to be
impossible not so long ago: domestication of a prototypical common
law legal institution into a civil code. The process of adaptation to
local conditions, testing the limits of the newcomer legal
institution and paying the price for mistakes to be made, has just
begun. As Hungary is a typical civilian legal system, it will be
could be learned about this newcomer contract and business model apart from
its recognition by the system. The common law influences are visible also from
the fact that the English term franchise is added – though in brackets – to the
title of the contract. For a review of European regulation of franchise see Tajti,
Systemic and Topical Mapping of the Relationship of the Draft Common Frame
of Reference and Arbitration, supra note 11, at 63. See also Tibor Tajti,
Franchise and Contract Asymmetry: A Common Trans-Atlantic Agenda?, 37
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV . 245 (2015) (The author vouches for
recognition of asymmetric contracts as distinct type of contracts and business
format franchise as paradigm asymmetric contracts that has becom e one of
the best example of successful transplants if adjudged based on experiences
within Europe and beyond. In addition to arguing that franchise should
become regulated also in Europe - for what US experiences should be taken a
closer look at - the author argues as well that asymmetry could be
deconstructed and consequently contract theory should develop a distinct
normative theory for franchises).
30. Book V on Property Law, Part Three on Proprietary Rights, Title VII
regulates the law on security interests – extending to both mortgage (real
property) and secured transactions (personal property) law. These provisions
denote the third revamping of the secured transactions law part; the first
being undertaken in 1996 upon the impetus coming from the Europe an Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and its Secured Transactions
Reform Project. See, e.g., Tibor Tajti, Comparative Secured Transactions Law
(2002); Tibor Tajti, Testing the Equivalence of the new Comprehensive
Australian Personal Properties Securities Act, its Segmented European
Equivalents and the Draft Common Frame of Reference, 24 BOND L. REV . 85
(2012), http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol24/iss1/4/; Tibor Tajti, Post-1990
Secured Transactions Law Reforms in Central and Eastern Europ e, 2 BULL. OF
THE
CHAMBER OF PUB. NOTARIES OF CNTY. SZEGED 18 (2013),
www.researchgate.net/publication/258728087_Post-1990_Secured_
Transactions_Law_Reforms_in_Central_and_Eastern_Europe.
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interesting to see what cognitive and practical results will come
out of this legal laboratory. Using CLT as the model means that
one should not look for a full replica, due to different policy
decisions made as well as the differing legal environment.
Some differences deserve brief mention here, not just for the
sake of a more precise comparison but because the same concerns
ought to be faced by other civilian jurisdictions planning to follow
the path of Hungary.
First, unlike CLT, HLT is perceived to be an agency-type
contract;31 or as Professor Langbein argued with regard to CLT–
a ‘modern third-party-beneficiary’ contract. 32 CLT actually is a
unique part of the common law that was enforced only in courts of
equity, rather than courts of law. 33 Notwithstanding that courts of
equity and law have been merged in the U.S., equity law still
applies to trusts. It is hard to see at the inception what the
repercussions of this special treatment for HLT will be,34
especially as U.S. literature speaks of CLT as a creature of
‘private’ law. 35 What the Hungarians might test, prove, or negate
empirically is the claim of Hansmann and Mattei from 1998 that
asset-partitioning offered by trust law is “difficult [if not]
impossible to arrange […] [relying] upon just the ordinary tools of
contract and agency law.”36 The law of equity, including equitable
remedies, is of major importance to trust administration in the
31. This follows, first of all, from the location of the provisions on trust in
the Civil Code: it is part of Title 16 on agency-type contracts, in Part Three on
Nominated Contracts of Book Six on Obligations. This is crucial for civilian
systems where the internal system of the Code is determinative. Secondly ,
section 6:330 of the Code explicitly foresees that in case of gaps the rules on
agency contracts (“megbízási szerződése”) should be applied. Thirdly, the
Comments also stress that the contractual-features of trust have been given
central position. See Menyhárd & Vékás, supra note 3, at 794 pt. 3.
32. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts,
105 YALE L.J. 625, 627 (1995).
33. See VALERIE J. VOLLMAR, AMY MORRIS HESS & ROBERT WHITMAN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO TRUSTS AND ESTATES 168-70 (2003). The authors define
trust as an ’arrangement’ which obviously encompasses a contract between the
settlor and the trustee if the trust is established by an agreement of trust.
This is not the case where the trust is established by a declaration of trust
where the same person is both the settlor and trustee when the trust is
created.
34. The number of related yet to-be-explored legal questions is significant.
For example, given that under Hungarian law no distinction is made between
’contract’ and ‘agreement’ based on consideration – as opposed to U.S. law, as
recently discussed by a court in Texas – this issue does not seem to raise
problems in Hungary. See Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013)
(consulting leading treatises on the law of contracts for the proposition that
the word ’agreement’ has a broader meaning than the word ’contract’); see
David R. Hodgman & David C. Blickenstaff, State Upholds Mandatory
Arbitration of Trust Disputes, 41 EST. PLAN. 13 (2014).
35. See Vollmar, Hess & Whitman, supra note 33, at 171.
36. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analy sis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV . 434, 479 (1998).
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U.S. Among other things, it serves the important function of
noticing the interests of trust beneficiaries as well as the interests
of trustees.
Another difference is that - to the extent possible - the
Hungarian lawmakers have tried to fix the areas where trusts can
be employed. Two such policy choices are deserving of elaboration.
First, whereas from the beginning of the development of trusts in
medieval times, oral trusts may exist under Anglo-Saxon law,
only written express trusts can be created under HLT. This
decision obviously serves to avoid all the uncertainties and
evidencing problems that recognition of oral trusts will generate,
and to force the parties to devote adequate attention to the details
of their arrangement under a heretofore completely unknown legal
category.37 Second, whereas all trusts since their development in
medieval times can be self-declared under Anglo-Saxon law, in
Hungary more stringent requirements are imposed on selfdeclared trusts. 38 Specifically, self-declared trusts can be created
only by way of an irrevocable declaration of trust executed in a
special deed form (“közokirat”).39
Under the law of Hungary, HLT cannot be employed as a
substitute for a profit-making company because the Hungarian
Civil Code limits the variety of business forms to four. 40 The price
of this policy choice is that compared to the wider application of
trust doctrine in the U.S., HLT is inevitably less versatile.
Beyond these limitations, although the new Hungarian Code’s
provisions represent prescriptive drafting, they are no more than a

37. PTK. § 6:310(2) (Hung. Civil Code).
38. Unfortunately, the drafters have refrained from coining a specific term
for this type of trust and have rather used descriptive language: roughly ‘when
the settlor and the trustee is identical’ (“ha a vagyonrendelő és a vagyonkezelő
személye megegyezik”). Given that the English translation of the new
Hungarian Civil Code is already available, it ought to be noted that the terms
the translators opted for may not be equal with the ones used in this article.
Concretely, while here we use the terms settlor and trustee, the English language translation used the pair principal and beneficiary. The choice of
terms depends on many factors from the background knowledge of the
translators to choices translators make, among others, to better convey the
gist of the local law. In Europe, of major impact is also the presence of British
English and the nomenclature used in the UK. Readers should always check
the exact meaning of local law provisions as the best way not to err. This
applies not only to translation from Hungarian to English.
39. PTK. § 6:329(1) (Hung. Civil Code).
40. PTK. § 3:89(1) (Hung. Civil Code). Note that one of the novelties of the
2013 Civil Code was the simplification of the rules on, and the integration of,
company law into the Civil Code. The hinted at limitation of company forms
means that in the case where a business fails to satisfy the formal
requirements of any of the recognized company forms, the company registry
will refuse its registration – meaning that the business cannot come into
existence. See András Kisfaludi, Commentary on the Company Law Chapter
(Book III, Part III), in A POLGÁRI TÖRVÉNYKÖNYV MAGYARÁZATOKKAL 127
point 2 (Lajos Vékás ed., 2013).
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combination of those few mandatory but predominantly default
provisions that are necessary to provide the guidance needed for
the introduction of a brand new legal institution. 41 This means
that in the future the success of HLT will depend on the
innovativeness of Hungarian counsel who may soon realize that
foreign experiences may be resorted to for inspiration. It may yet
be validly claimed that the new HLT law as well gives “almost
unlimited freedom to decide on the ‘trust terms’ (the provisions
governing how the trust will be administered and what
distributions of income or principal will be permitted or
required).”42 What adds a significant layer of uncertainty to this
seeming similarity is that for all the gaps, interpretative
questions, or dilemmas, HLT makes resort to agency and general
contractual principles a must – instead of creating a sui generis
trust law.
Equally interesting are trust-linked idiosyncratic common law
legal institutions that Hungarian drafters must strive to
disregard, or to create functional equivalents for. For example,
while it has been repealed in many U.S. states, the rule against
perpetuities might be one of the best illustrations of this point.
The Hungarian equivalent rule is seemingly straightforward: trust
contracts can only be concluded for a maximum of fifty years and
all contrary stipulations are null and void. 43 Besides this sentencelong provision of the Code, however, there is no further
elaboration, and thus it is unclear whether the myriad corollary
dilemmas known to U.S. law will occur. 44 There are also many
variations to U.S. trust law (e.g. spendthrift trusts, discretionary
trusts, directed trusts, asset protection trusts, dynasty trusts, and
decanted trusts). It is still unclear if Hungary will eventually move
to embrace these doctrines and, if so, which of the many variations
adopted by various U.S. states it will embrace.
3.

The Concomitant Licensing and Prudential Regulation

Given that the concept of the trust is a genuine newcomer in
Hungary, it was crucial to set the right track of development and
make the new system for Hungary maximally predictable and
safe. It was also logical to attempt to create the licensing and
prudential regulation of a new industry. While no distinct
licensing has been applied to the trust-lookalikes imported to the
country by the financial services industry (e.g., escrow accounts),
banking regulations have been created. The new regime was

41. Menyhárd & Vékás, supra note 3 at 794, point 4.
42. VOLLMAR, HESS & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 171.
43. PTK. § 6:326(3) (Hung. civil code).
44. See, e.g., VOLLMAR, HESS & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 966.
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introduced by enactment of a quite technical and detailed statute45
providing for formalities on the execution of trusts. 46
The prudential system created in Hungary rests essentially
on four pillars: (1) licensing and rules ensuring the financial
strength of professional trustees; (2) registration of serviceproviders (trustees); (3) registration of trust instruments; and (4)
supervision by the Hungarian National Bank. 47 There are also
various other rules that attempt to properly regulate trustees.
The system foresees two types of trustees with differing rules
applicable to them: ad hoc and professional trustees. Ad hoc, or
‘non-professional’ (“nem üzletszerűen eljáró bizalmi vagyonkezelő”)
trustees, are not subject to licensing, however, they have to
register the key data on the trust with the National Bank and file
the instrument containing the trust agreement. The registry of
these trust agreements is accessible only to various public
authorities (e.g., tax authorities, the agency controlling
competition law, and the public prosecutor’s office).
The rules are logically much more rigorous with professional
trustees. Similar to banking regulations, the law imposes quite
high requirements for capitalization and liability insurance. Then,
obviously following the logic of continental European company
laws, the rules limit the types of business vehicles available for
this new business sector, essentially limiting the HLT to be
employed like the closed corporations known to U.S. law. The
registry of trustees naturally is fully public and thus anybody
could double-check with the National Bank whether somebody
claiming to be a trustee is duly registered and therefore subject to
oversight. The remainder of the rules include the requirement of
employment of at least one lawyer, one economist, and one
accountant. The National Bank’s oversight powers are quite
meaningful. Yet time will tell whether these powers will be
sufficient to create a legal environment that can properly weed out
those who would carry out fraud and generally those who should
not be entrusted with the task of serving as trustees. Because the
quintessential feature of trusts is the demand of fiduciary
character in order to protect beneficiaries and others, much work
may have to be done in dealing with these needs. For instance, will
it be necessary for a trustee to invest with modern portfolio theory
45. 2014. évi XV. törvény a bizalmi vagyonkezelőkről és tevékenységük
szabályairól” (Act XV of 2014 on Trustees and on the Rules Applicable to their
Activities) (Hung.).
46. See VOLLMAR, HESS & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 191. For example,
while Florida imposes the same formalities as required for the execution of
wills, New York makes “every inter vivos trust be acknowledged before a
notary public or executed in the presence of two witnesses.” Id.
47. National banks in European countries are normally mentioned as the
kin of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) in the United States, though as the
mentioned Hungarian example shows, important differences exist as far as
their functions, powers, and general position are concerned.
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in mind, as is the case in the U.S.? Or will an overconcentration of
shares in a company be allowed as an acceptable investment
strategy? Will agreements be allowed to exonerate trustees? And
to what extent will the creators of trusts be allowed to fix their
terms?
Ultimately, the needed balance between giving effect to the
reasonable intentions of the trust creator while protecting the
rights of trust beneficiaries and others must be found. On this
matter, the U.S. has not been able to fully succeed, due, in part, to
the power of the banking industry to discourage the enactment of
provisions favoring the protection of the rights of trust
beneficiaries and others. 48
4.

Speculation on the Future of Hungarian Trusts

From the perspective of comparative law, it should be of
utmost interest how the trust – the newcomer type of common law
institution – will be domesticated in Hungary. At this inaugural
phase there is still much uncertainty. Concern for the unknown
issues that will surely present themselves causes unease. How will
the fiduciary duties of trustees, originally established by the
equity courts, be established and enforced in Hungary?
Given the versatility of the trust it may even make sense to
raise issues – which from the perspective of U.S. law may seem
outdated – regarding questions as to whether the HLT can be
exploited as a security device to bypass the secured transactions
system introduced first in 1996, following the unitary model of
security interests originating in Article 9 of the UCC. Those
familiar with the pre-UCC history of U.S. secured transactions law
know that in the pre-1952 period, the independent security device
of trust receipt played an important role in the U.S., especially in
the financing of the automobile industry (floor-planning). 49 The
48. See Robert Whitman & Kumar Paturi, Improving Mechanisms for
Resolving Complaints of Powerless Trust Beneficiaries, 16 Q UINNIPIAC PROB.
L.J. 64 (2002).
49. See generally Grant Gilmore, Chapter 4: The Trust Receipt, in
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 86, 86-128 (1965) (regarded as,
perhaps, the best summary of the pre-UCC history of trust receipts as
independent security devices). There is one important misunderstanding
related to the continued relevance of the law on trust receipts. Namely, albeit
trust receipts have been subsumed under UCC Article 9 and today they are
not visible from it – as instead of trust receipts normally a security agreement
(named as such) is used – the exploitability of trust as a security device
continues to be an issue in all systems that have a non-comprehensive secured
transactions system, like the Hungarian one. Likewise, jurisdictions that have
not known trust receipts but have decided to reform their laws following UCC
Article 9 must provide for this possibility, or trusts – due to their versatility –
could be resorted to in order to bypass the system. The best recent example is
Australia, which has reformed its system in 2009 and has specifically named
‘trust receipts’ as security interest-creating transactions. See Personal
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question of whether HLT can allow trust receipt transactions is
uncertain because Hungary has failed to introduce a
comprehensive secured transaction system, as the U.S. has.50
Examples directly linked to trust law proper can also be
found. One interesting question is whether the use of the revocable
living trust will become a strong competitor to the use of wills.
Besides understanding trust doctrine and realizing that lots of
cautious legal innovation will be needed, undoubtedly challenging
will be the realization that more interdisciplinary study is
required in the context of trusts compared to what has been the
case in the past with wills.
For example, is new law needed to make a judgment on
mental capacity in the case of modification or termination of
revocable living trusts?51 Can fees charged by trustees be
regulated?52
The future course of events may also depend on the relative
strength or exploitability of local fraudulent transfer laws by
creditors of the settler. This is of key importance because, as it is
commonly known, the federal-cum-state fraudulent transfer laws
of the U.S. are on average much more creditor-friendly than their
Continental European kin. This concretely has the effect that
while in the U.S. fraudulent transfer laws are frequently and
successfully utilized by both bankruptcy trustees and private
claimants, this is hardly so in Hungary and much of Central and
Eastern Europe. In brief, one may safely predict that, at least in
the initial years to come, attacks on HLT based on fraudulent
transfer laws (both within and outside the context of bankruptcy
law) will not be promising and hardly great in numbers. 53
Property Securities Act 2012 (Cth) § 12(2) (Austl.) and the related commentary
in ANTHONY DUGGAN & DAVID BROWN, AUSTRALIAN PERSONAL PROPERTY
SECURITIES LAW 47 (2012), sections 3.11 through 3.13.
50. See TIBOR TAJTI, Chapter on Hungary, in COMPARATIVE SECURED
TRANSACTIONS LAW (2002) (discussing the Hungarian UCC Article 9-inspired
secured transactions reforms); see also Tibor Tajti, Post-1990 Secured
Transactions Law Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, supra note 30
(identifying the latest developments in Hungary and in its neighbors). For
updates on Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Polish secured transactions and
bankruptcy laws (reforms, achievements, trends, open issues) see Tibor Tajti,
Security Rights and Insolvency Law in the Central and Eastern European
Systems, in SECURITY RIGHTS AND EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY REGULATION
(Gerard McCormack & Reinhard Bork eds.) (forthcoming February 2017).
51. See Robert Whitman, Capacity for Lifetime and Estate Planning, 117
PENN ST. L. REV . 1061 (Spring 2013).
52. See generally THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 971 CREDITS TO
TRUSTEE ON ACCOUNTING; LEGAL FEE OF TRUSTEE (Alan Newman, George
Gleason Bogert, George Taylor Bogert & Amy Morris Hess eds., 2014); UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 708 (amended 2010); Sarah S. Batson, Administrative Expenses
of Trusts: What did Congress Mean?, 59 S.C. L. REV 551 (2008); Philip N.
Jones, Final Regulation on Trust Administration Expenses – No Surprises, 121
J. TAX’N 25 (July 2014).
53. Fraudulent transfers law is a neglected topic of comparative law, yet –

2016]

Common Law Trusts in Hungary

725

Clearly, however, above all, the decisions to be made
regarding the law of “fiduciary duty” will likely prove to be the
most challenging. What will be the right, if any, for a beneficiary
to receive a fiduciary accounting? 54 Who will be given notice about
decisions to be made by a trustee? 55 When will a potential claim
expire because of time lapse? 56 What will be the rules regarding
spendthrift trusts57 and discretionary trusts?58 Which trust
provisions will be found to violate public policy? 59
In any event, while it is a fact that HLT can offer numerous
heretofore unavailable tools to fill gaps in the law that will be
useful to business and private concerns, some of the law in use in
Hungary and Central Europe, such as the usufruct on residential
properties, may cease to be employed.60 It can only be speculated
that parallel with the emergence of a professional class of trustees

as the U.S. experiences show and as U.S. authors stress – it plays a key role
not just in the context of trust law but generally asset protection. Besides
fraudulent transfers law proper, some other closely linked elements of the
system are also lacking in Hungary and many of the civilian systems. No
better example could be mentioned than the contempt of court rules, which are
much more severe in the U.S. Thus, for the time being at least, a claim that “if
the transfer is fraudulent or preferential, the debtor, along with his or her
planner, risks charges of contempt, bankruptcy fraud, and civil conspiracy”
might not necessarily be comprehensible. JAY D. ADKISSON & CHRISTOPHER M.
RISER, ASSET PROTECTION: CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING
YOUR WEALTH 57 (2004).
54. See generally Julia C. Zajac & Robert Whitman, Fiduciary Accounting
Statutes for the 21st Century, 36 ACTEC L.J. 443 (Fall 2010); Committee on
National Fiduciary Accounting Standards (The American College of Trust and
Estate Counsel), National Fiduciary Accounting Standards (May 1984),
www.actec.org/assets/1/6/Study19.pdf.
55. See generally ROBERT WHITMAN & DAVID M. ENGLISH, FIDUCIARY
ACCOUNTING AND TRUST ADMINISTRATION G UIDE (2002); JoAnn Engelhardt &
Robert W. Whitman, Administration with Attitude: When to Talk, When to
Talk, 16 JUN. PROB. & PROP. 12 (May/June 2002).
56. In the United States, statutes of limitations for state matters are
handled on a state-by-state basis and the statutes vary regarding the length of
time provided for.
57. See generally Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy:
Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1995); William H.
Wicker, Spendthrift Trusts, 10 G ONZ. L. REV . 1 (1974).
58. See generally Edward C. Halbach Jr., Problems of Discretion in
Discretionary Trusts, 61 COLUM . L. REV . 1425 (1961).
59. See generally Exceptions to the Calidity of Spendthrift Trusts – Public
Policy, in THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 224 (Helene S. Shapo, George
Gleason Bogert & George Taylor Bogert eds., 2014).
60. One of the disadvantage of the usufruct is that it is irrevocable and
thus, for example, the owner of an apartment – who has foolishly granted a
usufruct to an untrustworthy person damaging the property – cannot
terminate the usufruct without the consent of the beneficiary. He may only
ask for some kind of security for the damages, first amicably and – upon
refusal of the beneficiary – through court. This is not analogous but in certain
respects similar to the advantages of trusts over legal life estates discussed by
VOLLMAR, HESS & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 186.
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and their advisors, professionals will seek to employ new ideas
imported from the U.S. or created in other countries in Europe or
elsewhere.

III. CONCLUSION
The realization that trust law can fill important niches in
continental legal systems brings with it the realization that there
will certainly be new and challenging problems that will not be
solved immediately. The process of refinement of trust law on the
Continent so that it properly fits with civil law concepts entails the
creation of new ideas to be formulated by comparatively oriented
legal scholars. This entails also cognitive advancements which can
come from discussions between lawyers in common law and civil
law countries.
It is hoped that this article is seen as representing only a
start, rather than an ending, of the need for the comparative study
of trusts in the 21st century.

